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How to be Skilful: Opportunistic Robustness and Normative 
Sensitivity 
 
Abstract In a recent article, Ellen Fridland (2014) characterises a central capacity of skill 
users, an aspect she calls ‘control’. Control, according to Fridland, is evidenced in the way in 
which skill users are able to marshal a variety of mental and bodily resources in order to keep 
skill deployment operating fluidly and appropriately. According to Fridland, two prevalent 
contemporary accounts of skill — Stanley & Krakauer’s (2013) and Hubert Dreyfus’s (2002) 
— fail to account for the features of control, and do so necessarily. While I agree with 
Fridland that features of control represent desiderata for a satisfactory characterization of the 
capacity of skills to respond to perturbations, I argue that her account is limited in two ways; 
first it is applicable only to a particular class of skills I call motor skills, leaving other classes 
of skills unaccounted for; second, she employs a problematic distinction that rules out the 
automatic and pre-reflective use of discursive, propositional cues in skill deployment. I put 
forward a substantive elaboration of Fridland’s account based on two more general 
characteristic features of skills I call opportunistic robustness and normative sensitivity. I 
suggest that these features avoid the difficulties isolated, while preserving the substance of 
Fridland’s account of control. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
In their well-known model of skill acquisition, Stuart and Hubert Dreyfus sketch five distinct 
developmental stages, each of which characterised by “changes in the perception of the task 
environment.” (1980; see also Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, and Dreyfus 1997) Transitioning 
through these stages, one gains increasingly context-sensitive, holistic, and hierarchical 
recognitional capacities for how one’s skills can and should be applied.  Eventually, through 
hard work and effort, one can become what they call an ‘expert.’ But there is an interesting 
question to be asked of Dreyfus and Dreyfus about this expertise: what are we to make of 
experts who describe strenuous, ongoing practice routines?  If experts already have the 
requisite recognitional capacities for masterful, skilled performances, why do they continue 
to hone their craft, and what exactly are they honing? 
I don’t think the solution here is to posit another, subsequent level – say, ‘expert-plus’ – 
but to suggest that there is a lacuna in Dreyfus and Dreyfus’s (1980, 1986) account.  Though 
they have some things to say about how repeated instancing of skills can increase the 
sensitivity of recognitional capacities, they have little to say about the maintenance of skill, 
nor what such maintenance might consist in
1
.  It is not clear what Dreyfus and Dreyfus would 
say about the expert pianist, who continually plays and practices already well-rehearsed 
                                                     
1 Though, as I discuss below (in section 4.2), Hubert Dreyfus has developed a characterization of the structure of skills that 
does aim at addressing the maintenance and improvement of skill by experts.  
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pieces, as such experts would already have the necessary capacities and sensitivities needed 
to perform the music printed on the page. 
In a recent article, Ellen Fridland (2014) argues that accounts of skill must include 
structures that explain the maintenance and development of skills, including expert skills. Her 
target in the article is to outline a number of characteristic features of skills and skill users 
that she together calls control.  Control, as I understand it, points at a characteristic capacity 
of skill users to respond appropriately to perturbations and thereby keep skilled performance 
on track
2
. The characteristic features Fridland discusses, then, pick out structures and 
processes responsible for such a capacity, which keeps the deployment of skills at an optimal 
level (however optimal the situation allows).  Such structures are complex: they mediate 
between reason-responsive capacities to think, reason, and strategise, and lower-level sensory 
and motor abilities.  But not only do these structures mediate psychological abilities, they 
also play a role at several time scales: control is seen in the crafting of overall strategies for 
the satisfaction of intentions; in reining-in and directing sensory resources; and in employing 
motor responses hardy enough to deal with a wide variety of contextual factors.  For 
Fridland, the structures characterised by control are developed and maintained in attentive 
practice, where one expends effort in an attempt to improve various aspects of skill 
deployment
3
.  It is in such attentive practice that the possessor of expert skills is able to 
continually refine and hone her capacity to respond to perturbation. 
Despite its role in explaining skill development and maintenance, practice, as I see it, is 
not the focus of Fridland’s account.  To see why, consider the two ways in which one might 
highlight the role of practice in relation to skills.  On the one hand, one can discuss the 
structure and constitution of skills in and of themselves, articulating what such structures 
consist in, and how they are related to one another.  With a structure of skills on the table, 
one can then argue that practice plays the role of developing and maintaining such structures.  
On the other hand, one might focus on the fine-grained causal processes by which practice 
leads to increases in dimensions of behaviour associated with skills and skilled behaviour; 
perhaps by carrying out detailed neurobiological or psychophysical studies.  I take it that 
Fridland is focused on the former: she is concerned with detailing the structures and features 
she thinks are constitutive of skills. Indeed, Fridland argues that structures characterised by 
control are constitutive of skills, insofar as they account for the capacity to respond to 
perturbation, and are necessary to explain the development and maintenance thereof (2014, p. 
2729, 2732). In the process of sketching the key features of this capacity, Fridland suggests 
that two contemporary accounts of skill — Jason Stanley and John Krakaeur’s (Stanley and 
Krakaeur 2013) and Hubert Dreyfus’s (2002) — not only fail to notice the features associated 
                                                     
2 I use ‘perturbations’ as a place-holder term for what Fridland calls the ability to “focus on pressing situation demands such 
as adjusting [one’s] goals and strategies in the appropriate ways while allowing motor routines to run on their own.” 
(Fridland 2014, p. 20) 
3 ‘Attentive practice’ might suggest a focused, conscious effort to observe, repair, maintain, and improve various capacities 
and processes. Though Fridland might be read as suggesting such an intellectualist approach to practice when she states that 
practice is “effortful, attentive, intentional” (Fridland 2014, p. 2741), I believe a deflationary reading of these terms is more 
in tune with the arguments presented. Such a deflationary reading would hold that when one practices, one is deeply engaged 
in an activity with an intention (which need not be consciously entertained) to improve. It is in this way that I use the phrase 
‘attentive practice’. I thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point. 
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with control, but in the end do not have the resources necessary to accommodate or explain 
them. 
In this article, I will agree with Fridland that the development and maintenance of the 
capacity to respond to perturbation are necessary explananda for any account of skill.  
However, I will disagree that the structures of control she puts forward are the best way of 
capturing this capacity.  I will argue that Fridland’s characterisation of the capacity to 
respond to perturbation is limited in scope: it only applies to motor skills (such as those 
employed by the professional athlete), but cannot accommodate the wide range of skills that 
we associate with semantic phenomena (such as those demonstrated by the skilled poet, 
comedian, or scholar).  However, I believe that Fridland’s account contains more than a 
kernel of truth:  In the last two sections, I suggest that we should replace Fridland’s three 
characteristic features of control with two, more general features, I call opportunistic 
robustness and normative sensitivity.  I thus offer a critical elaboration of Fridland’s account: 
her three features of control turn out to be just the way in which opportunistic robustness and 
normative sensitivity are instantiated in the deployment of motor skills — but that these two 
features are a more general characterisation of what goes on in the development and 
maintenance of skills.  I conclude by suggesting that these two characteristic features are 
general enough to encompass both motor and semantic skills. 
 
2 Practice and Control 
 
What is the difference between myself and the renowned concert pianist Angela Hewitt when 
we each sit down to play the Goldberg Variations?  Assume that we can both play through all 
the variations, hitting all the right notes at the right tempo — why then does her performance 
sound so much better than my own?  I do not think the relevant contrast here concerns the 
piano each of us would be playing:  I could play her Fazioli and she could play my sticky-
keyed electronic piano, and I suspect her performance would still sound better.  So if the 
choice of piano, and the ability to play the notes correctly are not relevant differences 
between Hewitt and myself, what might the relevant differences be? Certainly, one such 
difference is the way in which Hewitt can perform subtle emphases in dynamics, together 
with her ability to highlight distinct yet complementary musical phrases. We might also point 
to her greater knowledge of musical history and theory, as something that gives her a greater 
appreciation of the structure and flow of the piece.  We can summarise such differences, I 
suggest, by stating that Hewitt’s piano playing skills have greater depth, subtlety, and 
reliability than mine, due to a wide variety of knowledge structures and motor capabilities. 
Fridland suggests that what distinguishes my piano playing from masters like Hewitt (or 
Argerich, or Horowitz) is that they have (or have more of) abilities to put into play a suite of 
“exact, nuanced, micromillimeter, microsecond adjustments and modifications.” (Fridland 
2014, p. 2737)  These minuscule adjustments moreover, “are painstakingly learned and 
developed through countless hours of practice and training.” (Ibid) What these lightning-
quick and accurate modifications realise, Fridland suggests, is the ability to recover and 
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respond to perturbations in the ongoing deployment of skills: they allow skilled performance 
to stay on track.  This capacity is explained by what she calls control. 
What does control consist in, if it explains the capacity of skill users to respond to 
perturbations? I suggest it should not be identified with the set (or conjunction of sets) of all 
such potential or actual adjustments that an individual could make at a particular time.  This 
would mistake a capacity with its customary effects.  Instead, control picks out a suite of 
processes and structures that together instantiate the ability to keep skill deployment ticking 
along.  What characterises this motley crew, Fridland suggests, are three features she calls 
‘strategic control’, ‘selective, top-down, automatic attention’ (what I will call ‘attentional 
control’), and ‘motor control.’ 
 
Strategic control consists in “goals, plans, and strategies that the agent uses in order to 
guide various instantiations of motor skill,” and is often, “though not necessarily, conscious.” 
(Fridland 2014, p. 2744)  What strategic control consists in, I suggest, is guiding 
implementation strategies: clever ways in which agents marshal a variety of skills and tactical 
decisions to satisfy their goals.  Consider the savvy tennis player here: assume that she 
knows, for one reason or another, that her opponent has a weak or predictable backhand.  She 
can employ this knowledge in any number of ways in order to beat her opponent: perhaps 
stringing together shots that push on the weak backhand; or by consistently producing 
powerful serves that exploit a predictable return.  Both of these tactical decisions result from 
using knowledge in conjunction with skills to achieve goal-satisfaction. 
Fridland rightly notes that it is not necessary for reasons or knowledge to be consciously 
entertained in order to play a role in strategic control.  To return to our tennis player, she may 
have merely noticed (without entertaining the thought) that her opponent’s backhand was 
faltering, and adjusted her strategy accordingly.   Despite not being entertained consciously, 
these reasons are still likely to be Anscombean. They are the kind of reasons that, if we 
stopped the tennis player and queried as to why she was continually playing to her 
opponent’s backhand, she would have no problem or hesitation in answering: she was 
playing to the backhand because it was faltering, because it was predictable, and so on
4
. 
The ability to recognise and employ reasons, and the ability to draw appropriate 
inferences and strategies accordingly, are both abilities that need to be learned, developed and 
maintained. But they are deeply integrated with lower-level processes that orient sensory 
systems towards potentially salient information in the environment: it’s only when such 
systems are aligned with the environment in the right way that individuals can notice and 
pick-up on epistemically important information in the world.  The structure responsible for 
such orientating is what I call ‘attentional control’ (equivalent to Fridland’s ‘selective top-
down automatic attention).  It consists in “selecting the relevant features in an environmental 
array that a skilled agent should gather information about and respond to, given her goals, 
plans, and strategies.” (Fridland 2014, p. 2746) 
                                                     
4 This should not be conflated with the claim that experts can always provide reasons for why or how it is they did the 
precise movements or actions that they did: experts regularly fail to accurately describe the minutiae of their own 
performance (Wallis 2008, p. 130). 
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Fridland’s diagnosis here is that “learning a motor skill requires more than learning how 
to control one’s body, it also requires learning how to control one’s attention.” (Ibid) Skill 
involves the ability not only to perform skilled behaviour, but also to pick up on where and 
when performance of particular behaviours are appropriate: Should the hockey player pass 
the puck to the defenseman (and maintain possession) or should she take the shot (and thus 
likely lose possession)? What the skilled hockey player relies upon in these decision-making 
situations are contextually relevant reasons.  If our hockey player notices that the defenseman 
on the blue-line is not in a good position, she would know that taking a shot on net is likely to 
be the best option, even if she were not in an ideal position.  But being able to extract such 
contextually relevant reasons requires a capacity for aligning one’s self with the situation — 
for being ‘ready’ to pick-up on potentially salient information. 
Our hockey player shows how one's reasoning capacities are only as good as the 
information coming in: she will not be performing optimally if she is not attuned to the right 
sources of information in her environment.  As I hope to have made clear, then, Fridland’s 
attentional control is the complement to strategic control: the trained, automatic routines of 
attentional control orient experts to potentially salient information in the environment by 
bringing these to the foci of their sensory systems.  Once picked up by sensory systems, such 
information is poised for use by rational capacities.  Thus, while attentional control “is 
automatic,” it is “sensitive to the semantic content of the intentional states of the agent.” 
(Ibid) That is, it serves the overall intentional satisfaction of goals. 
The contrast I have just drawn, to be clear, is between the automatic processes of 
orientation-routines (attentional control) and the non-automatic reason-responsiveness of 
strategic control.  While orientation routines can be trained to align with particular situations 
or features in the environment, the alignment with such ‘environmental arrays’ does not yet 
mark out a process of reason-responsiveness. Attentive orientation routines are selective 
attunements, and while they engender changing arrays of sensory information, these changing 
arrays are not reasons, though the content of such sensory experiences may be rationalisable 
(see: Crane 2013). 
The third and final feature of control is what Fridland calls motor control.  Motor control 
facilitates the deployment of skills: the smooth graceful movements of the ballerina, the 
percussive movements of the pianist, and the swinging hips of the golfer.  Motor control is 
not evidenced in the skills themselves, but in those physical modifications that respond and 
fix or otherwise tweak the skill in its deployment.  It consists, as I understand it, in sensitive 
bodily responses to a wide variety of situational parameters.  As Fridland characterises it, 
“motor control is crucial for accounting for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled 
performer modifies, adjusts and guides her skill instantiation.” (Fridland 2014, p.2748)  
Motor control involves keeping skilled behaviour within the parameters of the task 
environment as best it can, in being ideally attuned (or suited) to the situation such that skill 
can be fluidly deployed. 
Keeping skilled behaviour in check involves lightning-quick responses: the ‘nuanced 
micromillimeter, microsecond adjustments’ that so impress Fridland.  The requisite speed of 
such adjustments implies that they are not suitable for intervention by conscious awareness 
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— they are automatic.  Indeed, Fridland calls them ‘automatized motor routines,’ bringing to 
mind the rote behaviour of repeat actions.  But the notion of automaticity here need not mean 
mechanical, nor unintelligent
5
; in fact, it is precisely by being context-sensitive and 
appropriate that these adjustments do their work.  Further, many of these motor routines may 
be performed slowly and attentively during practice, at a speed where conscious awareness 
and intervention is possible.  But despite attentive intervention at practice-time, it might not 
be possible when push comes to shove in real-time performances.  I take it that when 
Fridland calls a process like the adjustments of motor control automatic she has this ‘too fast 
to think’ notion in mind. 
Let me attempt a summary.  Fridland’s characterisation of the capacity underwriting the 
ability of skill users to respond to perturbation (control) has three characteristic features.  
First there is a general capacity to employ reasons in a wide variety of decision-making 
processes to satisfy goals.  These capacities are reliant upon automatic orienting routines that 
align one’s sensory systems with potentially salient and information-rich aspects of the 
environment.  Finally, we have a suite of automatic motor responses that allow for the overall 
smooth functioning of skills when deployed.  This smooth and automatic function is what 
frees one's attentional resources to selectively attend to environmental arrays, which in turn 
allows for more strategic thinking, and so on.  Finally, attentive practice, as I understand from 
Fridland’s account, consists in improving the overall reliability, subtlety, and speed of such 
processes for the overall aim of satisfying goals. 
 
3 Control, Discursive Cuing, and Semantic Skills 
 
3.1 Two Critiques of Control 
 
Fridland argues that the three features of control she isolates are “constitutive of skilled 
action.” (Fridland 2014, pp. 2729, 2732)  However, as Fridland's examples suggest, her 
account is only meant to apply to what I will call motor skills: gymnastics, yoga, golf, 
football, tennis, and the like. But how then, are we to account for other skilled actions? After 
all, we consider poets, scholars, comedians and the like to be skilled. And while these skills 
might involve a motor component it is not clear that Fridland’s control adequately captures 
the capacity of such semantic skills to respond to perturbation, nor how such robustness 
develops in attentive practice. I show in section 3.3 that not only does Fridland’s account of 
control not say anything about this latter category of skills it also cannot, because her account 
seems to take motor skills to be an essential and constitutive component of skill. Yet, by 
taking as her target a capacity seemingly shared by all skill users – the ability to respond 
appropriately to perturbation – Fridland’s focus on how such a capacity is instantiated in 
motor skills is too narrow. I argue that a broader account is needed, one that I offer in section 
4.  
                                                     
5 See: Fridland (forthcoming) 
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Before turning to such a positive account, I consider in section 3.2 Fridland’s arguments 
against Jason Stanley and John Krakauer’s recent characterisation of skills (Stanley and 
Krakaeur 2013; hereafter, S&K).  Though she criticises S&K for making a strict separation 
between reason-responsive capacities and mechanical-like motor reactions, I argue that 
Fridland too makes a similar and troubling distinction between the non-automatic and 
discursively structured strategic control and the automatic structures of attentional and motor 
control. Far from being an initial prompt or a gloss of a performance (e.g. the teacher’s 
instruction to ‘bend your knee like this!’), propositional knowledge can play an integral role 
in the fluid deployment of skills by focusing one’s attention on certain aspects of the task 
environment.  Such ‘discursive cuing’, I suggest, puts pressure on Fridland’s argument that 
strategic control ‘does not automate’ because it is too course grained and general to guide 
performance in real-time. 
 I will suggest that this argument is flawed insofar as it aligns discursively structured 
knowledge with non-automatic, general features of environments and skill requirements.  
While Fridland is right to be critical of the separation S&K make between knowledge and 
action as involving two different processes — what I call a ‘prompt and play’ account of 
skills — her account of control makes a similar mistake, separating knowledge and action in 
virtue of the kinds of processes they are involved with, non-automatic and automatic 
respectively. As I will show, the heuristic values of such distinctions are offset by the way 
they obscure fruitful uses of propositional knowledge in skill deployment.  In section 4., I 
offer an account, which, I argue, does not foreclose the possibility of propositional 
knowledge playing such roles.  
 
3.2 Propositions, attention, and cuing 
 
Jason Stanley and John Krakaeur have recently defended an intellectualist account of the role 
of knowledge in skilled action (Stanley and Krakaeur 2013).  According to S&K, traditional 
accounts of skill have mistakenly taken the motor component of skill, what they call motor 
acuity, to be constitutive of skills
6
. However, empirical and clinical results suggest that the 
deployment and on-going use of skills requires a stock of knowledge-that, particularly 
knowledge-wh (knowledge-what, knowledge-where, knowledge-why) that articulates the 
appropriate circumstances for the deployment of skills, and which further prompts the 
execution of the motor component of skills in order to satisfy intentions.
7
  According to S&K, 
to truly have a skill and be able to use it, one needs not only to have the brute motor abilities 
involved in skilled behaviour, but also to have knowledge about the organisation of the task, 
how to initiate action, and what successful action consists in.  Only with the combination of 
knowledge and motor abilities can one know what appropriate motor ability to deploy in any 
given situation and, indeed, have the ability to deploy them. This account of S&K can be 
                                                     
6 I follow Fridland in taking S&K’s use of ‘abilities’ and ‘acuity’ to be interchangeable in this context. 
7 See Carter and Pritchard (2014) for a sceptical evaluation of Stanley’s argument that knowledge-wh can be incorporated 
into the category of knowledge-that.  See also Fridland (2012) for a more developed arguments against S&K’s 
intellectualism. 
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usefully deemed a ‘prompt and play’ account: once knowledge prompts the deployment of 
skill, it unfolds in a mechanical and formulaic way. 
Fridland is rightly concerned with this ‘hybrid’ account of S&K’s, and the way it 
“[combines] guidance by propositional knowledge with basic, mechanistic, subpersonal 
motor and perceptual abilities.” (Fridland 2014, p. 10)  The account seems to fail in 
accounting for the way in which skills are both quick and reliable.  Further, it is not simply 
that skills persist under perturbation and variation. Experts often respond in unrehearsed and 
creative, yet appropriate ways.  To give an impressionistic, though not perfect example, 
consider the occasional sensational use by the tennis player Roger Federer of the ‘tweener’ 
shot: unable to get behind the ball to make a forehand or backhand return, Federer has 
sometimes employed a shot where he hits the ball backwards through his legs.
8
  
I suggest that it is hard to characterise the sensational and creative deployment of skills as 
the formulaic employing of mechanical motor abilities, executed by the prompting of some 
knowledge-wh.  Instead, such instances seem to consist in a surprising and ingenious 
combination of skills that together make the best of a (perhaps heretofore unseen) situation. 
Situations involving unrehearsed but appropriate behaviour seem to go unaccounted for in 
S&K’s account: in these situations, agents do not have the requisite knowledge-wh, yet still 
manage to act intentionally and appropriately.  And such situations do not seem to be 
unusual: tennis players execute a number of strange shots taken from contorted positions that 
they seemingly come up with on the spot — do we want to suggest that these behaviours 
have been prompted by knowledge-wh?  On S&K’s account, the flexible and creative use of 
skills by experts would seem to require an extremely large and broad set of such knowledge-
wh; a set that would account for all the minutia of an expert’s performance.  
There are some indications that this strong intellectualist account — where all of skill is 
to be accounted for in terms of a stock of knowledge-wh — is what S&K have in mind.  They 
state: “We should […] emphasize that use of knowledge to select actions continues in the 
skilled state because there is always the possibility to perform new actions based on further 
knowledge.” (Stanley and Krakaeur 2013, p. 9)  While such a strong intellectualist account 
cannot be ruled out a priori as impossible, it seems doubtful, and, in any case, S&K would 
owe us an explanation for how it is that one can have knowledge that prompts the use of new 
or otherwise unrehearsed and creative motor routines. 
The other component of S&K's hybrid account, motor abilities, also seems unable to 
account for the quick, reliable, and occasionally creative deployment of skills.  For S&K, 
motor abilities consist in relatively fine-grained and formulaic motor procedures that increase 
in precision through practice (p. 9). Definitionally, this seems to put the onus of reliability 
and creativity on the skill user’s knowledge-wh, about which I have just voiced scepticism. 
Further, S&K’s account seems unsuitable when attempting to address the overarching 
concern of this paper: why experts continue to practice, and what structures are implicated in 
the ability to respond to perturbation.  For experts seem to do more than improve their stock 
of knowledge and the precision of their motor abilities when they practice.  As Fridland 
                                                     
8 The most sensational ‘tweener’ I can think of is Federer’s return to Novak Djokovic in the semi-finals of the 2009 US 
Open. 
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states, “if [according to S&K] all there is to skill is propositional knowledge about how to 
initiate and perform a particular action plus the possession of the motor and perceptual acuity 
to do it then the intelligence of skill will be identical to the intelligence of unpracticed, 
intentional actions.” (Fridland 2014, p. 2743; See also: Fridland 2012) But not only does 
attentive practice seem to improve the reliability of skills, it also seems to allow for increased 
appreciation of one’s own skilled behaviour, and for the kind of creative deployment 
discussed above. 
I agree with Fridland that S&K’s characterisation of the relationship between knowledge 
and behaviour is unsatisfying. But so too is Fridland’s characterisation. Fridland, like S&K, 
seems to demarcate the reason-responsive processes that characterise knowledge, and the 
motoric processes of behaviour.  Whereas S&K make this distinction in terms of the nature of 
the processes themselves, Fridland’s demarcation results from the role of automaticity in her 
account.  For Fridland, attentional control and motor control are automatic in the fluid and 
flexible deployment of skills: they function without conscious intervention.  By comparison, 
strategic control, the reason-responsive capacity to construct strategies and implement tactical 
decisions “does not automate.” (Fridland 2014, p. 2745)  Fridland’s argument here is that 
these reason-responsive, propositionally-handy capacities do not automate because they are 
“concerned with the global, non-domain-specific features of a performance.” (Ibid) Fridland 
offers the example of energy management: during extended tournaments with a large number 
of games, athletes need to know how to manage the future state of their energy and fitness. 
Such global non-domain-specific features, further, are precisely the kind of things that a 
propositionally structured strategic control can reason about, but which attentional or motor 
control are not apt to handle. 
But Fridland’s chosen role for strategic control, in reasoning about how best to deploy 
skills over time, seems to miss a prevalent use of propositional knowledge in cuing 
behaviours during the deployment of skills.  What I call discursive cuing involves the 
deliberate re-orientation of attention due to automatic, rehearsed propositions.  Consider here 
Montero’s (2013) recent work on the way in which discursive practices may be an entrenched 
feature of the expert behaviour of ballerinas.  Drawing on her own experience as a 
professional dancer, Montero suggests that ballerinas often employ sub-vocal utterances 
during both rehearsal and performance.  Such sub-vocal utterances like ‘remember to keep 
your arm up, here!’ or ‘keep those ronds de jambes smooth the whole way through!’ are 
diectic cues that focus dancers’ attention on relevant aspects of the environment and of skill-
deployment. 
I suggest that this is a specific instance of a more general phenomenon discussed by Clark 
(1997, 2008).  Clark suggests that experts are ‘doubly expert’: “they are expert at the task at 
hand but also expert at using well-chosen linguistic prompts and reminders to maintain 
performance in the face of adversity.” (Clark 2008, p. 48)  Clark gives the example of the 
way in which expert players often encourage themselves to perform at their peak.  This kind 
of internal cheerleading is similar in kind to Montero’s positional reminders, and other kinds 
of ‘instructional nudges’ discussed by Sutton (2007).  I suggest that discursive cuing is a 
handy catch-all phrase that captures the way in which propositional knowledge can function 
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via sub-vocal utterances to focus attention. Such cues act as context-sensitive guides, 
orienting the performer to salient aspects of the environment and of an on-going skilled 
performance. 
The important thing to note here is that discursive cuing straddles the automatic/non-
automatic divide.  The actual triggering of the discursive cue can be automatic, the result of 
continuous recitation of the phrase during practice.  In this sense, they can be “automatized 
into routines that run in the absence of explicit attention” (Fridland 2014, p. 2745).  But such 
routines function by being conspicuous: the discursive cue causes a focusing of attention 
because one notices or utters a phrase here, at this time. 
I suggest then, that Fridland’s separation of reason-responsive capacities from 
behavioural capacities by means of automaticity does not work: in both practice and 
performance, skill-users can employ propositional cues and prompts that keep skilled 
behaviour on track.  Strategic control cannot neatly be distinguished from (at least) 
attentional control.  But one might also worry about the distinction between attentional 
control and motor control: part of what it means to be an expert athlete is to have very fine-
grained discriminations about how skills are to be deployed, but this certainly means that one 
will have to be oriented toward the deployment of motor control.  The skilled hockey player 
has to pay a great deal of attention to how the puck sits on her stick in order to make a 
satisfying wrist shot, and the gymnast has to have a great sense of the positioning and 
stability of her limbs in order to do her acrobatic routines.  In such situations, it seems, 
attentional control collapses into motor control. 
These reflections suggest that things are much messier and murkier than Fridland’s 
account indicates: one cannot mark out reason-responsive capacities from other capacities in 
virtue of whether or not they are automatic, and further, Fridland’s features of control may 
overlap and be functionally co-extensive at various instances.  This suggests that Fridland’s 
features of control are best seen as heuristic aids in characterising various features of skill 
deployment, and thus are not clear-cut categories reflecting real constitutive structures of 
skills.  I will suggest in sections (4.1 – 4.3) that we should generalise these heuristic features 
into a more encompassing account. 
But I also think that the phenomenon of discursive cuing points to another difficulty in 
Fridland’s account.  She seems to discuss control  – the structures and processes that allow 
for appropriate responses to perturbation – in terms of how it responds to problems in the task 
environment. But if we buy into Clark's idea that part of what expert athletes do is motivate 
themselves to work harder, to push more, to grab opportunities when they are presented, we 
seem to end up with a very different picture of control than merely ‘keeping things in 
bounds.’ Instead, part of the robustness that control points to is opportunistic; in addition to 
motivating themselves, skill users are able to seize on chance moments and novel 
possibilities to respond in creative, unrehearsed ways. 
 
3.3 Semantic Skills 
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A particularly striking limitation of Fridland’s characterisation of the capacity to 
accommodate perturbations is that it only accounts for such in motor skills. But our use of the 
term ‘skill’ seems to refer to a general class or category of behaviour, which encompasses a 
number of subsidiary kinds.  Here I contrast Fridland’s control with a category of skills I call 
semantic skills.  These are skills that involve the manipulation of vehicles of semantic 
content, such as when writing, speaking, or reading. I then show that Fridland’s notion of 
control does not have the resources to characterise the kind of accommodation to perturbation 
we see in semantic skills. Thus, while Fridland is interested in characterising of the ability of 
skill users to respond appropriately to disturbances – the capacity improved by attentive 
practice – and takes such a capacity to be constitutive of skills, her focus on motor skill belies 
the general nature of such a capacity, and, further, her account of control is not flexible 
enough to account for all actualisation of this capacity in skilled behaviour.  
Consider a comedy improviser.  I contend that an excellent comedy improviser – one who 
is very good at eliciting laughs, who easily finds the right moment to jump into the routine, 
who has the ability to think quickly on the spot – demonstrates a wide variety of difficult-to-
master, context-sensitive skills. Fridland’s control seems inadequate to characterise the 
acquisition and deployment of the skills possessed by this comedy improviser.  Though such 
an improviser must selectively attend to aspects of the environment – riffing on previous 
jokes, picking up on opportunities for well-timed remarks – it seems hard to characterise such 
selective attention as automatic. Instead, the comedy improviser must always be attending to 
the various aspects of the ongoing scene, constantly evaluating what to say and when to jump 
in.  Further, she is attending to the semantic content of situation, sub-vocally testing out 
various jokes and one-liners that she thinks would be humorous — rejecting some and using 
others.  But because of the open-ended nature of comedy improvisation, because she has to 
attend to the changing context and semantic content of her co-actors, attentional control is not 
something that could automate for this improv comic.  
The feature Fridland calls motor control also seems a poor fit: there just doesn’t seem to 
be a good analog when it comes to characterising the skills of the comedy improviser.  What 
would motor control consist in here — the ability to know when and what body position to 
take? What funny face to make?  Perhaps, but we know of the comedic ‘straight-man’, 
someone whose emotional performances are muted for comedy effect, could also be an 
excellent comedy improviser.  We might also think of an insult comic at this point: a good 
insult comic functions by making a number of lightning-quick responses and quips that don’t 
really seem to require motor sensitivities at all (and they may also lack other sensitivities, 
perhaps social ones).  
Finally, comedy improvisation seems to contrast strongly with strategic control.  What 
would it mean for the improv comic to have a ‘strategy’ or ‘plan’?  It certainly couldn’t mean 
that the comic had her performance planned out in advance, or that she has a clear sense of 
the way in which the performance will or should develop.  Though there might be some kind 
of direction to her performance, the open-ended nature of improv comedy is subject to all 
sorts of strange and zany interventions that confound strategies for the deployment of skills. 
The improvised comedic performance, I contend, lacks the overarching teleology of most 
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sports and motoric activities that Fridland uses as examples. In situations like comedy 
improvisation, it’s not clear that one can construct strategies and tactics in the manner of her 
‘strategic control’.  
So Fridland’s control seems ill-poised to account for comedy improvisation. I suggest that 
it will similarly be ill-poised to deal with those skills that involve the employment of 
semantic vehicles, such as printed or typed words, verbal utterances, graphs and plans, and 
the like.  Control will fail to account for these kinds of skills, I suggest, because of their open-
ended nature, and because such skills do not have an essential motoric component
9
.  
Paradigm cases of such open-ended semantic skills are the ability of poets to skilfully arrange 
(both physically and sequentially) words on a page, the ability of the philosopher to analyse 
and decipher arguments, and the ability of architects to interpret and visualise architectural 
drawings.
10
  
We might think that Fridland’s account might still be applicable here by arguing that 
semantic skills merely differ from motor skills in the way they selectively emphasise the 
different structures of control she characterises.  For instance, in athletics, we might argue 
there is a great deal of motor control and (perhaps) less strategic control, whereas in the 
crafting of a poem there is a great deal of something like strategic control and very little 
motor control.  Aside from worries about how one might quantify and compare these 
different aspects of control, whether or not these various structures are clearly demarcatable, 
and whether or not the features Fridland characterises can be straightforward imported to deal 
with semantic skills, I think we can reject such an argument.  In many semantic skills it is not 
that there is a contrast with motor skills in the amount of motor control employed: it is simply 
that any particular motoric component is non-essential.  One can verbally dictate poems, 
write them out longhand, or tap them out in morse code. We might even think the potential in 
so-called brain-machine interfaces, where various robotic or virtual tools are manipulated by 
thought alone, might rule out the necessity for any motor component whatsoever (see: Clark 
2007). Motor control and particular motoric components do not seem to be necessary for 
semantic skills because such skills are not tied to any particular motor implementation.
11
  
Let me reiterate the argument: Fridland’s features of control are supposed to characterise 
the structures involved in the capacity of skilled individuals to respond appropriately to 
perturbation. However, her characterisation seems to be focused on how this capacity is 
instantiated in motor skills. I have suggested here that this characterisation will not generalise 
                                                     
9 I will not have more to say about the ‘open-ended’ nature of semantic skills here. I suggest that the ‘open-endedness’ 
pointed to actually picks out two relatively distinct but large issues: the role and prevalence of creativity and imagination in 
skill deployment, and the way in which individuals can appropriately switch between skill-sets and associated 
understandings of situations. The former issue is intuitive; the latter is more complicated and difficult to see. It is related to 
the problem that has recently been discussed as ‘context-switching’; how individuals determine what particular skill (or 
combination of skills) should be employed to best satisfy our dynamically shifting goals (Wheeler 2008; Kiverstein 2012). I 
am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me on the nature of this claim.  
10 Some of the examples I have employed here, including the visualisation of architects, seem to implicate another kind (or 
perhaps, dimension) of skills: those that involve expressive or aesthetic behaviours and evaluations.  I will have little to say 
about the role of the aesthetic with regards to skill, only here suggesting that skill is likely characterised along a number of 
dimensions, and that the various kinds of skills are likely to clump together in regions of this multi-dimensional space. 
11 This is an argument from multiple realisability — one can perform the same task, of shuffling semantic vehicles or tokens, 
in any number of ways.  Note however, that this is different from the way in which multiple behaviours might serve the same 
teleological role in achieving the satisfaction of desires or the achievement of goals. 
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to capture how other skills accommodate in response to perturbation. Despite these 
criticisms, however, I do think there is a great deal of merit to Fridland’s account.  In sections 
4.1 - 4.3, I argue that her account can be abstracted into two general principles that capture its 
spirit, if not its specifics.  This allows us to make substantive comments about the general 
characteristics of the category of skill as a whole. 
 
4 Rescuing Control 
 
4.1 Opportunistic Robustness and Normative Sensitivity 
 
In what follows, I want to suggest that we should replace the Fridland’s control, as a way of 
explaining the ability of skill users to appropriately respond to perturbation, with two more 
general characterising features of skill: opportunistic robustness and normative sensitivity.  I 
argue that these characteristics pick out general features of the overall category of skill: they 
are evidenced in the skilled humanities scholar who is an expert at breaking-down arguments 
and writing sharp and effective responses, to the skilled orator who can deliver a convincing 
speech to a rapt audience, and finally, to the case that impresses Fridland, the skilled athlete. 
 
4.2 Normative Sensitivity 
 
Hubert Dreyfus’s account of skill comes up for some particularly harsh treatment by 
Fridland.  He is accused of giving a mere phenomenological gloss on the deployment of skill, 
rather than articulating the structures of skills and explaining how they arise and are used.  
Further, he is accused not only of missing, but of being fundamentally unable to explain the 
ongoing development and maintenance of expertise through practice.  For Fridland, Dreyfus’ 
characterisation of skill as ‘absorbed coping’ shifts the brunt of the explanatory burden from 
the realm of intentional explanation to subpersonal, automatic mechanisms of Hebbian-style 
learning.
12
  This, she thinks, is unacceptable.  Yet, if Dreyfus is right that experts are “non-
thinking non-calculating, and non-rule-following,” when they are in the state of ‘absorbed 
coping’, Fridland is right to ask how it is on Dreyfus’s account that experts “do all the fancy 
things that they do?” (Fridland 2014, p. 2734)  Fridland wants an account of skill to do real 
explanatory work, which means showing how lower-level structures can interact and engage 
with intentional processes to realise the amazing feats of experts.  
Fridland is right to criticise Dreyfus, but I think that she is hasty in her whole-cloth 
rejection of his account. The first thing to note here is that Dreyfus’s characterisation of skill 
and skill acquisition is deeply intertwined with his exegesis of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and 
Merleau-Ponty.  As such, it is tangled up with the way that skills feature as a part of an 
                                                     
12 See: Fridland 2014, p. 2735.  For a response to this line of criticism against Dreyfus, see: Rietveld 2012.  As Rietveld sees 
it, Dreyfus’s employment of the term ‘Hebbian’ does not implicate a process of hard-wiring, where neural wiring would 
serve as the subvenience base for something like a psychological disposition.  Instead, Dreyfus’s remarks in this context 
should be taken to be a rough description of the dynamic process that partly realise flexible and fluid skill deployment 
together with bodily and environmental structures. A potential sub-personal processing account that Dreyfus points to here is 
Walter Freeman’s neurodynamics (Freeman 2000). 
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existential-phenomenological framework. Often, Dreyfus’s explanatory interests are at cross-
purposes with those of philosophers such as Fridland who are interested in causal and 
structural accounts of how bodily and intentional causes together explain skill acquisition and 
deployment.  To the extent that these two interests converge in Dreyfus, it involves taking 
existential-phenomenological structures as incumbent on any causal-mechanical account of 
human capacities to accommodate
13
. As I see it then, Dreyfus is predominantly interested in 
articulating and demonstrating how an agent’s understanding of the world (which certainly 
involves skills) allows for the acquisition and appreciation of – and manoeuvring within – the 
normative aspects of situations (See, esp.: Dreyfus 1991, 2007a). 
This is not to let Dreyfus off the hook: Gardner has convincingly argued that Dreyfus 
often slides from making transcendental arguments about the role of skills into arguments 
about the necessary constitution and structure of our cognitive apparatus (Gardner 2013).  To 
the extent that Dreyfus takes authors such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to be offering a 
picture of how skill is instantiated in human brains, he may be misappropriating the 
transcendental tradition these authors represent. This is not to say that a causal-mechanical 
account of skill based on Dreyfus’ considerations would be wrong or unrealistic14; just that 
the inspiration and justification of such an account would involve distortion. However, I 
agree with Fridland that Dreyfus’s characterisation of skill leaves much to be desired.  His 
account of ‘absorbed coping’ holds that when individuals are employing their skills to the 
utmost they completely ‘merge’ into the activity. In such a state, any mental activity at all is 
disruptive — so experts, when they are truly using their skills, are mindless (Dreyfus 2005, 
2007, 2013). This account is at loggerheads not only with the account offered by Fridland, 
and here by myself, but an increasing amount of empirical and philosophical reflection 
(Montero & Evans 2011; Zahavi 2013)
15
.  Nonetheless, I think Fridland’s almost exclusive 
focus on a single article of Dreyfus’s, when he has written so extensively on this issue, is 
somewhat uncharitable
16
. 
In contrast to Fridland's dismissal, I think that the normative aspect of Dreyfus’s account 
is useful, and does give us a clue as to how skill acquisition and development work.  It also 
gives us the tools to articulate what it is that experts constantly refine in practice.  Such a 
normative account is evident when he speaks of “the gradual refinement of responses that 
grows out of a long experience acting within […] shared cultural practices.” (Dreyfus 2000, 
p. 162).  What does such a claim consist in?  Dreyfus suggests that what one needs to achieve 
such gradual refinement is “a motivation continually to improve,” which consists in “both the 
                                                     
13 This should not be taken to suggest that Dreyfus has not engaged with causal and structural accounts of human capacities 
like skills. Indeed, both the accounts of Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980, 1986) and Dreyfus (1972/1992) were sustained 
criticisms of the GOFAI (Haugeland 1985) approach to capturing the intelligent, goal-directed behaviour of human beings. I 
thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to be clearer on Dreyfus’ engagement with cognitive science. 
14 See, for instance, Freeman (2000) and the remarks in Dreyfus (2007b) for on such potential development of Dreyfus’ view 
of skill. 
15 See especially the numerous studies cited in Montero & Evans 2011.  There, they exhaustively demonstrate that one of 
Dreyfus’s flagship examples, chess, is not adequately characterised as mindless: expert chess players utilise a number of 
deliberative, calculative processes while playing. 
16 That is, Dreyfus 2002.  But see also Dreyfus (2005) for claims of a similar nature.  For a more complete characterisation 
of Dreyfus’s account of skill, one would need to detour into his detailed exegesis of Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Merleau-
Ponty (i.e. Dreyfus 1972, 1991,2000, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).  This, unfortunately, is beyond the scope of this article. 
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willingness to take risks and a commitment to excellence that manifests itself in persistence 
and in high standards for what counts as having done something right.  One must also be 
sensitive to the distinctions in the relevant domain.” (Dreyfus 2000, p. 171)  One example 
given by Dreyfus of ‘continually improving’ and of the commitment to excellence is the way 
in which musicians can cultivate their sensitivity to pitch, eventually achieving perfect pitch 
(Dreyfus 2000).  What Dreyfus is gesturing at here, I suggest, is that human beings have and 
can develop subtle discriminatory responses to meaningful phenomena in the world — even 
if those phenomena are the arbitrary classifications of tones in European musical traditions. 
The kind of structured sensitivity Dreyfus has in mind here is, I think, best spelled out in 
terms of Rietveld’s (2008) notion of directed discontent. Directed discontent characterises the 
way in which skilled experts are able to make innumerable sensitive, fine-grained 
discriminations of both errors (including potential errors) and opportunities for action.  
Consider Rietveld’s example of the architect: “When the architect sees that the door is too 
high, he is certain that the door is not correct ‘like this.’ He can instinctively express, gesture 
or say ‘Too high!’, without necessarily having in the back of his mind some explicit goal, for 
example, that the door should be 14.8 ft. high." (Rietveld 2008, p. 981)  What this example 
draws attention to is not only the various ways in which someone can evaluate and point to 
something as disconcerting, but what such discontent consists in: something in the world 
could be better.  Directed discontent is a felt normative evaluation of situations in the world. 
Of course, such normative reactions are not only manifested in situations we might 
broadly call ‘ameliorative’, that is, situations where things call out for improvement.  They 
are also manifest in opportunistic situations where one has to seize opportunities, as I 
discussed in section 3.2.  When an expert hockey player notices that part of the net is not 
covered by the goalie, she is drawn to take the shot. Being drawn here consists in an 
evaluation of the context – one that leads to further action.  It is this ability to respond pre-
reflectively to the normative aspect of tasks, I contend, that Dreyfus has in mind when he 
talks about the ‘affective fields of forces’17 that solicit behaviour from experts.  Dreyfus is 
not attempting with this phrase, I suggest, to give a causal explanation of how skilled 
behaviour is actually functioning, but instead how normative evaluations and appraisals can 
have motivational force without the interjection or reflection upon rules.  So, insofar as 
Dreyfus is concerned with ‘non-thinking, non-calculating, non-rule-following’ experts, he is 
interested in characterising the way in which we can have pre-reflective normative 
sensitivities that motivate us to act
18
. 
What an expert develops in practice, I suggest, are normative sensitivities.  In attentive 
practice, one learns to selectively discriminate among innumerable deeply contextual aspects 
of skill deployment.  This kind of sensitivity and its satisfaction, I contend, is what experts 
                                                     
17 For example, in Dreyfus (2013, p. 21).  A related phrase is used through Dreyfus’s corpus.  In Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986, 
this is called a ‘world of opportunities’ (p. 30). 
18 Such a pre-reflective account of skills and understanding is caught up with Dreyfus’s exploration of Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of motor intentionality: a characterization of intentional engagement with the world that does not make recourse to 
mental representations of beliefs, desires, and goals (Dreyfus 2007c; Merleau-Ponty 2012; Wrathall 2005). While I think that 
the account under development here somewhat speaks to truth of motor intentionality, a fuller discussion of the structure of 
intentionality, and how my account weighs upon it, would go well beyond the considerations of this article. 
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are getting at when they say that things ‘feels right’19.  This is also why an account like 
S&K’s that relies on rote rehearsal, emphasising the precision of skill deployment, flies wide 
of the mark: one doesn’t merely improve how skills work in their deployment, but also one’s 
ability to evaluate the situation, and, as I will suggest in the next section, to react 
accordingly
20
. 
Here I have suggested that what practice develops is the ability to refine one's sensitivities 
– to hone one's evaluative capacities. Practice allows one to see what is right, wrong, and 
what could go right and wrong.  It provides and increases one’s stock of normative 
sensitivities — things that can be appreciated, that are frustrating, that seem wrong, that are 
ripe for the picking.  They are what enable the expert “to see what should be done to improve 
the current situation or solve the problem; to perceive and act on possibilities for action.” 
(Rietveld 2008, p. 980)  
 So how does this bear on Fridland’s account?  I suggest that we see that normative 
sensitivities are developed in various domains at different levels of grain. We can analyse and 
understand various processes in virtue of the way in which they are selectively sensitive to 
the normative character of the situation: whether it involves sifting and sorting among 
reasons employed in particular situations, learning what and where are the informationally-
rich ‘environmental arrays’ in the world and how to orient to them, and learning the various 
sensations that are indicative of problems. That is, we can understand various structures and 
processes in virtue of how they help satisfy the abstract role of being sensitive to the 
normative aspect of situations. 
 Despite arguing that all Fridland’s structures of control employ normative 
sensitivities, I do not think that this collapses normative sensitivity into attentional control. 
As I hope the considerations above show, it is not clear that the normative sensitivity 
involved in different aspects of skill performance should be treated as a unitary phenomenon: 
the kind of attentive capacity to pick up on the normative character of the world seems 
importantly different when we consider our reason-responsive capacities from when we 
consider our ability to notice slight differences in the flow of sensation. Nonetheless, I think 
that we can characterise such capacities in terms of the abstract role they play: as involved in 
generating affective responses to the normative character of the world
21
. 
 I contend that cashing out the development and maintenance of skills in terms of 
normative sensitivities is the start of a more general and satisfying characterisation of the 
ability of skill users to maintain skill deployment and to respond appropriately when 
                                                     
19 Do mathematicians and logicians develop normative sensitivities, and correlated affective sensations? Despite the fact that 
mathematicians and logicians employ rule-governed structures, they can do so in a variety of ways. Understanding what 
makes deployments of mathematics or logic elegant and sophisticated (as in proofs) is what development of normative 
sensitivity consists in for such domains. Thus contra Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986), I think there are many interesting things to 
say about the skills and skill acquisition in ‘structured’ areas like mathematics. I thank an anonymous referee for raising this 
issue. 
20 There is more to be said about the relationship between propositionally structured knowledge and intentional, skill-
governed action (i.e. Fridland 2012).  Suffice to say, many authors impressed by the work of Merleau-Ponty are sceptical of 
the full-blown intellectualism of S&K, and suggest that motor intentionality is a more phenomenologically on-key structure 
that explains skilled behaviour that need not make any recourse to propositions or rules (See, inter alia, Wrathall 2005). 
However, as I have suggested with discursive cuing, such hard and fast separation between propositions and skilled 
behaviour might be too simplistic. 
21 I thank an anonymous referee for putting forward this objection. 
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disturbed (See: section 4.4 for a more comprehensive comparison between Fridland’s account 
and my own).  While Fridland is right to point to the fact that we can be selectively sensitive 
in a motoric way, learning how to move one’s body just so when encountering this particular 
situation; I here suggest that we need an analogous account for the normative evaluations and 
ameliorations that go on in the skilled poet or the skilled comedian – how to be sensitive to 
the various ways one can manipulate one’s words and intonation just so to accomplish this 
particular effect. 
 
4.3 Opportunistic Robustness 
 
Normative sensitivities are not the whole answer as to what is developed and maintained in 
attentive-practice.  We also need to account for the aspect of control that explains “the 
nuanced, particular, fine-grained modifications and adjustments that an agent manifests in 
skilled action.” (Fridland 2014, p. 4) What Fridland is arguing for here, I suggest, is that 
controlled skill does not merely consist in ‘micromillimeter, microsecond’ motor 
adjustments. Rather, expert skills evince a kind of robustness.  Skills, even semantic skills, 
consist in fine-grained sensitivities and attentive capabilities that allow for reliable, superior 
performance.  Such reliable superior performance is actualised by both maintaining and 
developing skills, what Ericsson characterises as “stretching performance beyond its current 
capabilities […] while preserving other successful aspects of function.” (2006, p. 698)  I call 
this quality, where one is able to simultaneously maintain and improve the deployment of 
one’s skills, opportunistic robustness. 
Opportunistic robustness, as I envision it, is the counterpart to normative sensitivity 
(developed in section 4.2).  There I suggested that these sensitivities have the function of 
signalling that the situation could be better in some way — and that practice trains and adds 
to our stock of discriminatory capacities that get a handle on what is going wrong, what could 
be improved, and what opportunities could be seized.  Opportunistic robustness, I suggest, 
consists of structures that realize such capabilities. 
Such opportunistic robustness will play out differently with different kinds of skills, but 
as Fridland is right to point out, such robustness is often in play pre-reflectively (Zahavi 
2005).  Though one can often reflect on the minute movements or strategies that one employs 
in the actualisation of skills — perhaps rehearsing movements, and imaginatively running 
through scenarios in one’s head — in the heat of the moment, the ability to respond to 
disconcerting aspects of the situation must happen quickly and fluidly.   
Opportunistic robustness and normative sensitivity, I suggest, can only be made distinct 
in a heuristic way. Despite the fact that they are discussed separately here, they are, as it 
were, two sides of the same coin. Yet, this should not be taken to imply that they are always 
commensurate. Consider a deep and devoted fan of classical music who does not play an 
instrument herself: through many repeat exposures to orchestras (both live and recorded) she 
can discriminate between the different sounds of the instruments in an orchestra, as well as 
when these instruments are out of tune.  Regardless of what she may know about how to tune 
such instruments (that flutes pull out their mouthpieces, that string instruments turn pegs) she 
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will lack the robust skills needed by professional musicians to quickly and accurately tune 
instruments. Instead, her only means of responding to out of tune instruments or orchestras is 
by turning off the recording, or leaving the performance. So despite having very rich and 
well-developed normative sensitivities, her ability to respond to the situation is coarse – in 
fact, it is all-or-nothing. 
Considering now the reverse relationship, I am suspicious that that one can have robust 
skills to respond to disconcerting aspects of a scenario without having some kind of (at least) 
pre-reflective normative sensitivity.  I suspect this is what Rietveld means when he states that 
directed discontent “is affective and behavioural at the same time.” (Rietveld 2008 p. 976) By 
training ourselves in the production of a certain skill or set of skills, we are likewise training 
a set of normative sensitivities.  
 
4.4 Control, Normative Sensitivity, and Opportunistic Robustness 
 
Here I propose that the combination of the two general characteristics I put forward offers 
an account that is more general, but at the same time more powerful, than Fridland’s account 
of motor control.  Not only does it allow us to see Fridland’s strategic control, attentional 
control, and motor control as contributing to the way in which individual might respond to 
perturbation in a particular class of skill – motor skills – it also allows us to give diagnostic 
properties of skills as a kind that encompasses a variety of heterogeneous classes. 
Specifically, it incorporates the semantic skills that I suggested could not be captured by her 
account (and perhaps others). At the same time, normative sensitivity and opportunistic 
robustness allows us to keep the character of motor control, i.e.: “that which accounts for an 
agent’s ability to guide and modify her actions appropriately.” (Fridland 2014, p. 2732) 
Let me attempt to be as explicit as possible about the links between my account and 
Fridland’s. When it comes to motor skills, I suggest that we see normative sensitivity and 
opportunistic robustness as instantiated in each of the structures that she characterises: in 
strategic, attentional, and motor control. In both learning and attentive practice, one can 
develop the sensitivity to various aspects of the task environment and improve one’s ability 
to respond to such sensitivities at each level of Fridland’s account.  
Take Fridland’s example of Gabby Douglas, who won the individual all-around artistic 
gymnastics gold medal at the 2012 Olympic Games in London. When Gabby carries out her 
routine on the balance beam “she takes off with the right amount of force, she jumps 
backwards at the right angle, she arches her back to the right degree, she places her hands in 
the right location on the beam […] she executes her tumbling pass as she intended to. She is 
in complete control.” (Fridland 2014, pp. 2730-2731) I suggest that this is because Douglas is 
able to notice when situations are not ideal, perhaps “if her foot were to slip a touch on 
landing” (Fridland 2014, p. 2731), and has the capacity to recover and ameliorate the 
situation. Here I suggest that such motor control exemplifies how normative sensitivities and 
opportunistic robustness are instantiated. Over many trials (both real and imagined) Douglas 
has developed felt sensitivities (perhaps to ‘foot-slippage’) and nuanced and subtle means of 
responding to such felt sensitivities to keep her gymnastic routine going. 
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Attentional control too demonstrates how normative sensitivities and opportunistic 
robustness can explain skill users’ capacity to respond to perturbation. Attentional control 
aims at characterising how relevant information is noticed and exploited in situ: the ability of 
hockey players to notice undefended areas of the ice, tennis players to take advantage of 
weak backhands, and the like. The example of Gabby Douglas does not work especially well 
here for one of the reasons I gave above, as it seems like here attentional control collapses 
into motor control: Douglas’ attention is focused on the way in which her motor routines are 
being deployed and how they will be deployed (where her foot will land on the beam, where 
her hands should be positioned, etc.). But in situations where attentional routines can be made 
distinct from motor routines – as in the case of hockey players who’s gaze is keyed to look at 
defensive or offensive positions – we can see that such routines are also instantiations of 
normative sensitivity and normative robustness. Attentional control is developed by 
increasing the number of informative, environmental arrays one is sensitive to – by 
developing the sensitivities to where important information lays, and routines and strategies 
to orient towards them. 
Finally, strategic control consists (at least) in the ability to reason about possible 
outcomes, link together tactics, and, as I’ve suggested, employ discursive cues. Such reason-
responsive capacities, it shouldn’t be surprising to note, can be improved by recognizing the 
relevance of various sources of information, reconfiguring one’s tactics and strategies over 
time, and employing a number of prompts and mantras. Gabby Douglas, for instance, has 
developed the ability to reason about how best to allocate her energy on the four events of the 
individual all-around, utilize propositional cues to keep her performance at a high level and to 
motivate herself to succeed
22
, as well as recently, to reason about which coach is best able to 
analyse her movements and help her further her career. Such instances of strategic control, I 
suggest, are best seen in terms of how they are developments of sensitivities to reasons, and 
the ability to employ these reasons in an appropriate way to realise the satisfaction of goals. 
Strategic control too is well characterized by seeing it as a specific instantiation of normative 
sensitivities and opportunistic robustness. 
So Fridland’s control seems to be captured by the two more general characteristics I’ve 
put forward. Each of her levels of control are instantiations of structures that exhibit felt 
recognitions of situations in the world, and motivational pushes to improve or exploit the 
situation in some way to keep skill deployment on track. But to show that my two 
characteristic features of normative sensitive and opportunistic robustness are a good 
characterisation of skilled behaviour tout court, even semantic skills, consider an expert 
philosopher: Not only is she able to sort out the essential components of the argument from 
the rhetorical filler, she is able to notice the weak point in deduction, or the error in 
judgement.  Utilising other capacities and skills, she is able to construct and convince others 
                                                     
22 Douglas suggests, at qualifiers for the United States of America’s national gymnastics team, during a slip on a 
performance she thought to herself: “Okay, yeah just grab the bar and just finish this routine, and kind of don't make it a big 
deal.” Though we should rightly be suspicious of such post-hoc rationalizations and phenomenological reports, it seems 
likely that Douglas could have uttered something akin to this during her performance. Insofar as Douglas did, in fact, utilize 
a discursive cue like the one above, I suggest it is aimed at keeping at bay a number of over-reactive affective evaluations. In 
effect, such a cue aims at modulating emotional responses, which might lead to feelings that everything is going wrong. 
(See: Stranahan, 2013) 
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of this misstep in reasoning, or the way in which her account is more convincing than others. 
Further, she is able to employ this skill in a wide range of formats (analysing power-point 
presentations, grading undergraduate essays, listening to oral arguments, etc.).  The 
generality of her skills certainly plays a role in being able to apply them to a wide variety of 
philosophical formats — but here it is in the reliable ability to perform well, despite the 
variety in the semantic vehicles being utilised, in which her skill consists. Consider again the 
architect. She is able to tell, in a wide variety of architectural situations, what is and is not 
correct — and she can take steps to ameliorate such a situation. Her skill here consists in the 
wide variety of situations in which she is able to provide and offer correctives and 
improvements.  
When it comes to semantic skills, opportunistic robustness and normative sensitivity 
consists not merely in being reason-responsive, but in being able to selectively attend – to 
determine which reasons are important – and to use them appropriately. It consists in being 
able to ameliorate one’s position, and knowing when to make risky decisions and to seize 
opportunities.  Just as in motor skills, the opportunistic robustness of semantic skills 
develops, I suggest, by developing the normative sensibilities I introduced under the moniker 
of directed discontent.  Directed discontent is an evaluative and motivational push that 
generates behaviour. In directed discontent, a stock of fine-grained discriminations to which 
we are sensitive, guides fine-grained control over the situations in which the skill applies 
(Rietveld 2008). 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
Fridland’s account of control is a perspicacious one.  With it she has highlighted various 
features and structures that have been erroneously underemphasised or indeed are entirely 
missing from contemporary discussions of skill.  Further, she has pointed to several 
characteristic features as marking out structures experts can continually improve through 
attentive practice.  However, I have argued that Fridland’s account is unduly restrictive. 
Despite aiming at characterising a general capacity of all skills, it seems to arbitrarily focus 
on motor skills, and rules out whole classes of skill. Further, it rules out the possibility that 
discursive practices can play a positive role within the execution of tasks, for example as a 
way of cuing, a reminder to pay attention to select aspects of a scenario.   
I have suggested that the way out of these worries is to see control as an instantiation of 
two more abstract characterising features: normative sensitivity and opportunistic robustness.  
These features are general characteristics of skills, and point to the kind of abstract structures 
that allow an agent to respond to perturbation, and which are improved through attentive 
practice. Though one can train normative sensitivities without a correlated increase in the 
richness of robust responses (as the example of the dedicated music listener shows), attentive 
practice or training in the production of skill — whether such practice takes place in the 
medium of writing, or music, or dance, or athletics — consists in the development of both.   
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Returning to one of the examples above: why is Angela Hewitt’s performance of Bach’s 
Goldberg Variations so much better than mine?  Her performance is better because she has 
developed fine-grained determinations (much finer than mine) that are reliably and robustly 
invoked in the deployment of her skill.  She is drawn to act through the development of 
normative and motivational structures, coupled with reliable and robust strategies for 
noticing, responding, and seizing upon relevant phenomena in the deployment of skill.  She’s 
probably practiced a whole bunch more. 
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